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THE IHDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN THE LOW COUNTRIES IN THE FIRST 
HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY~--A COHPARATIVE CASE STUDYl 
by 
Joel Hokyr 
Northwestern Europe has always enjoyed a prominent and perhaps 
slightly disproportionate role in the discipline of Economic History. 
It is therefore surprising that the Low Countries in the 19th century 
have as yet not received from English-speaking Economic Historians 
the attention they deserve by their location, their size and the unique-
2
ness of their case. 
This neglect is the more surprising because the two countries, 
Belgium and the Netherlands, offer a unique opportunity for compara-
tive economic history: ovo countries of comparable size, located in 
the same corner of Europe, surrounded by giants, with considerable 
overlapping in linguistic a~d cultural backgrounds. One of them, 
Belgium, undergoes a process of ra?id industrialization in the first half 
of the 19th century, emerging in the 1840's as the most industrialized 
country on the continent. On the other hand, very little industria= 
lization can be observed in the Netherlands in the first half of the 
19th century. It may be important to inquire into the underlying 
causes of this gap not only in order to understand the particular 
economies of the Low Countries, but also because this investigation 
could shed some light on the mechanisms of economic growth and 
industrialization in certain types of economies. 
The first section of this paper will be devoted to a summary 
description of the industrial sectors of the two countries between 
-2-
1798 and 1850. Then some of the traditional explanations that have 
been put forward to explain their divergent patterns will be presented. 
This will be followed by a simple lfto'del of economic growth ·which will 
help in focusing on one crucial element in the differential development 
of the two countries. In section IV, the basin relevance of this 
model will be demonstrated. Finally, some evidence will be presented 
and some suggestions for future research made. 
I 
For the purpose of this paper it is useful to define the dis­
continuous element of the industrial revolution as the adoption of a 
new technology that is used to produce the same (or very similar) 
commodities that were formerly produced, by a new and more capital­
intensive technique. The new technology is exogenously given to the 
economy (in this case, imported from England). This makes ~~;possible 
to point at the closing years of the 18th century as the beginning of 
the industrial revolution in Belgium. From the beginning, three main 
centers of this industry can be distinguished: (i) the cotton center 
in East Flanders, in and around Ghent; (ii) the wool center in the 
d4partment de 3. 'Ourthe (now the province of Liege);· along the Vesdre 
with Verviers and Eupen as its main focal points; (iii) the heavy 
industry in the city of Lieze and surroundings and in the department de 
Jemappes (now the province of Eainault). 
These three industr-±es underwent remarkable expansion in the 
closing years of the 18th century and the first twelve years of the 19th. 
This can be illustrated by a few figures t~at are, of course, a poor 
substitute for an exhaustive study on the Belgian industry in the 
-3-
French period ~~t still rennins to be written. The mechanized cotton 
spinning industry in Ghent grew from zero i:a 17i8 (the year in which 
Lievin Bauwens smuggled his first mule from England to the continent) 
to 115,000 spindles employing about 10,000 workers in 1810.~ There 
is reason to believe that Ghent accounted for about two thirds of the 
4
total cotton industry in Flanders. The order of magnitude attained 
by this industry in a short period can thus easily be seen. 
In 1798, the same year that mechanized cotton spinninr, was 
introduced in the Continent, the wool-producing firm of Biolley and 
Simonis in Verviers hired William Cockerill to construct the first 
spinning mills and carding machines at their plant. As in the cotton 
industry, the discontinuous element in this development is not the 
emergence of a new innustry ~ nihiJ.o, but rather the application of 
a new technique to the production of old goods and the associated 
quantitative expansion, The annual rate of grm-rth of the output of 
drapes between 1800 and 1810 is estimated at 6%, as compared to 0.46% .....,.... •;, 
5
beb1een 1752 and 1784. 
As foc:the heavy industry, the data arc~ less easily interpreted; 
two of the major breakthroughs in the English iron industry namely 
the use of coke in the smelting process and Cort's rolling and puddling 
process were introduced only after the Fren~h period. 
6 .~evertheless, 
the number of blast furnaces , estimated at 63 in the period before 
1795, rose to 83 in 1814. The output per furae:ce grew from less than 
1000 kg. a day to as much as 3000 kg. a day. 
7 Total output of cast 
iron in the departement Sambre et Heuse (today the province of Namur) 
grew according to one source from 10,671 ton in 1789 to 15,240 in 1811. 
8 
-4-
The collapse of the iJapoleonic Empire and the incorporation of 
Belgium in the Dutch monarchy caused considerable strain to the young 
Belgian industry. By the end of the decade, however, it seems that 
recovery was by and large complete. In the mid twenties many important 
technological changes were intrcduced, including i. a. widespread use of 
steam power and mechanized weaving in cotton and wool. The total 
number of spindles in the Flemish cotton industry doubled in the 15 years 
9
of Dutch rule. The total amount of fixed capital in the cotton-spinning 
industry in East Flanders was estimated by a contemporary writer to have 
10 
grown from about 1.5 million guilders in 1817 to 2.7 million in 1826. 
Similarly the woollen industry recovered after suffering a severe setback 
in the last years of the Empire: the arrondissement of Verviers produced 
about 88,000 pieces in 1811, 65,000 in 1815 a.nd between 100,000 and 12'},000 
, 11
in,.a-1830. Likewi~e~ the metallurgical industry grew considerably: 1817 
marks the founding of John Cockerill's faaous machine factory at Seraing, 
soon to become the most prominent pl<",nt of its kind on the Continent. 
Total output of cast i::on t·Jas eeti:::iated in 1.r<1r, t-n ht=i h~ million pounds 
12
(29 thot:.sand ton). In the mid -:hirties estimates vary between 135 
d l co . d 13t housand an _. tnousan ton. Output of coal increased from 16 thousand 
ton in 1815 to 180 thousand in 1830.H 
After the revolution of :830, industrialization seemed to lose 
some momentum. The:~.e is .sc::ae evidence that the rate of growth of the 
cotton industry, due to a £al: in the price of the final goods as well 
15 
as rising raw material prices, was slowing down considerably. Some 
growth, however, still went on, despitE:c difficulties on the demand 
side. In 1846 the number of spindles in the cotton industry was about 
-5-
the same as in 1836,
16 but raw cotton imports increasea
17 so that 
it is possible that excess capacity was reduced and that old machines 
were replaced by new and better ones. The woollen industry fared 
much better and was able to quadruple its exports between 1832 and 1844 
(though the starting point of this series is unnaturally tow). 
18 The 
greatest expansion was experienced by heavy industry, doubtlessly due 
in part to the construction of a railway network. In 1850, thus, Belgium 
emerges as the most industrialized country on the Continent. 
It should be emphasized that the new industry did not supplant 
the old industry for <1. long tir.1e, but rather coexisted with it for most 
of the period under discussion. The old industry in Belgium before 
the industrial revolution ·w<2a a typical nproto-i:i.dustry"--a rural­
domestic industry of pco.oontc uho had to suprler.i.ent tlw.ir incomes 
which had become insufficient because of ;)Opulation pressure on the 
land. 19 The three main centers of the proto-industrial sector 
t with the three centers of modern industrytcoincided to a large exte:--.. 
the linen industry in Flanders, the woollen industry around V~rviers' 
and the metallurgical putting-out industry (nail-makins, cutlery etc.) 
in Liege, Hainault and l~amur. That this is no fortuitous coincidence 
will soon become clear. 
As to the Netherlands, the availability of data is even more 
But it is beyond doubt that industria­restrictive than in Belgimn. 
lization was considerably slower. It is important to keep in mind 
that at the beginning of the period the detherlands were far from 
being a non-industrial country. Especially in the maritime province 
(Holland), much industry existed. Host of these industries were 
-6-
"traffics", i.e. activities associated directly or indirectly with 
Dutch commerce and shippi:::c; (which were still substantial at the end 
of the 18th century). In addition to ship-yards., sail making and food 
packing industries, the most important industries were paper, glass and 
earthware, sugar refineries, distilleries and breweries, tobacco, 
luxury textiles (calico printing) etc. Some of these industries had 
20
already declined considerably in the 18th century, others much less so. 
It is clear, however, that these industries suffered very severely 
during the French period, especially during the years of the continental 
21blockade, and declined to a fraction of their initial size. The 
impoverished Dutch cities lost considerable fractions of their population, 
22
and many of the remaining urban dwellers were reduced to charity. 
The post-lJapoleonic period was a period of slow recovery for the 
traffic industries. The lack of data does not allow the determination 
of the extent to which this ret:overy was completad by 1830. 1:-i11at is 
clear is that ilcdustria.lization of the k:tnd that 3elgium had experienced 
did not take place. In 1830 the lnrgest m:d. best known r.1achine factory 
23
in the Netherlands employed only 80-100 ,-1ori.;.2rs. T:-,e textile industry 
i n t h e T.,-1ente\. areas was sta.gnant 
24 ·1 ·" t.1e1 woo.i...Len~ • • • t ry J_n. thew:i:u.E: 1.nctus 
South (around Tilburg) gn.w very slowly anc: onl:1 with considerable govern-
25ment help. No other indus·::rie~'3 of importance seem to have developed. 
The secession of Belgium in 1830 ge.ve a first push to adoption of 
new and more efficient tec:miques in the Netherlands. A few signs of 
modernization can be observe..:l. SoGe progress was made in the traffic 
industries in the maritir,,e provinces, ar.d even more important were the 
-7-
developments in the few areas ire which the:.e was some proto-industry 
(mainly in the East and South). The tot:i.l horsepower of the steam 
engines used by the cotton industry in thE: Twente area rose between 
1830 and 1850 from a negligible 18 HP to a slightly less negligible 
220 HP. 
26 Exports of th:..s industry increased from about 30,000 
pieces in 1834 to 730, oori pieces in 184C, 
27 The influx of a few 
Belgiam. Orangist e~1tre:,reneurs, as well at, the demand of the Dutch 
Inda.es for cotton goods; no longer supp:.ied by Flenish industry, 
explain this gro,,,rth" In the Ti:1..bi.irg a:i:ea in the South, where these 
beneficial effects were by and large aosent, growth was mach slower. 
Thus one could expec:: a large gap between the two countries 
around 1850, although divergent rates of growth do not prove this a priori. 
Unfortunately the lack of comparable natioual income accounts mnke such 
a comparison impossible. Some very crude indicators can be used here, 
however, to hint at the orders of magnitude involved. The total 
number of steam engines in the Dutch economy in 1837 is estimated at 72 
with a of 1120 HP, rHmhing to 392 machines with 7193. 25 HP 
in 1853. The corresponding figures for Belgium for 1846 are 1514 
machines, with a capacity of 37,007 HP. 
28 The total value of Belgian 
textile exports in 1844 was about 60 million francs in 1833 prices, 
. . 29
or a f ew percent 1ess 1.n cur~ent prices. Dutch textile exports 
in current prices (ave~age 1846-1850) was 9.4 million guilders or 
some 20 rai·1·....1.on ~:.. t a'fi<CS. 30 A very different cut equally suggestive 
illustration pen.ains to the par':itipation i:c. the famed Crystal Place 
exhibition in ::..851. i,;::~lgium was repres£ntec. by 512 entries which won 
2 gold medals and 97 :iis·-::incticr:.s, Ths :::ethe:-:lands se:1t 114 exhibits 
-8-
. , 11 ' -, l 1( " . ~ . 31 The Belgiano f whic h one receivea a go a ;-n.e:o.a._ a:~u , c1.stinCLJ.ons. 
population at the time uas approximately 50% larger than Dutch popula-
tion. 
II 
Some explanations of this quite remarkable example of uneven 
development have been suggested in the literature, though the problem 
itself has not frequently been posed in explicit form.. 
32 The most 
obvious difference between the two countries is in their respective 
physical endowments: Belgium has rich deposits of coal and iron, 
whereas the Netherlands have relatively more fertile agricultural land, 
but no iron and virtually no coal. This argument can hardly explain 
the whole phenomenon since two of the pivotal sectors in Belgian 
industry, wool and cot to:,., uacd imported rav :i-iaterials. Steam power 
began to be used widely in 3elgium oaly after 1825. On the other heii'd, 
the Dutch did have :cich endo,,'ID.ents of ;_:,eat, uhich ;;.;as widely used as 
33
a f ue1 in. Dutch in. dustry. In addition,the im?ortance. of wind as an 
energy source sho1-1.ld :10t be d:isconnted. The pc.per, oil and sawmiUl 
industries in lforth Holland relied heav-ily on this cheap source of 
power. 34 
The difference in h:i.storieal bac:qnound is of somewhat greater 
importance. Destructive ~-Jars and political settlements had destr~yed 
all of the Belgian. shipping accl c0mmerce and most of its industry in 
the last decades of the 16th century, whereas these activities prospered 
in the Netherlands. The resu].t was that a politically dominant commercial 
class a la Al:lsterdam--probatly a hindrance to mo~ern industry--was absent 
-9-
in Belgium. Of equal importance was the absence in Belgium of a 
heritage of technological traditionalism and entrepreneurial conservatism. 
The latter two were some of the factors that made it so difficult for 
the Dutch traffics to transform themselves into modern industry. Losses 
sustained by the traffic industries in the last third of the 18th century 
and the first decade and a half of the 19th may have discouraged the 
already very risk-&verse Dutch investors from industrial projects. 
Linked to this argument is the emphasis put on the demand side. 
The Belgian provinces were annexed to FtJ~r..ce in 1795 and enjoyed a 
large market of 50 r:o SJ ni11.::..or. ccr:s 1.1::iers (including Dilitary demand, 
an important cor,rpm,ent) t1n'.::..J_ th,.'! ,::')J 1e:,se of the -First Empire. This 
demand more tha:,. compens:-~t•?a for th-3 lo:::s of the overseas market. On 
the other har.d, t:ie Lie·::1:.e:c:'..:,:;,:;s 121.e L,.. ..:or-:·orL;:e~ into the Empire as 
late as 1810 ., and tl1e ta1icf b.:::n:::i-,, c bet\•,',_en t~1e Dutch provinces and 
the rest of the Er:i.pire ,-,as nr : li:'.: ::2c1 uut:i.l 1812, 35 :Jbviously ~ ad-
vantages on the der.iand side p-r.:.vided the Helg:'..2ns uith a considf·r­
able edge over the Du-:.:ci:i.. rioweve:-, this canaot fully explain the 
continuous growing of the gap du:=ing tl1e Dutch period and the post­
revolutionary period,. and it is certain that the :J..ndustries that grew 
36in Belgium during the Empire werE; not "hot-house industries 11 • 
Similar to this vein is the line that emphasizes the various 
roles of the respecti7e governments that ruled the two countries. The 
help and encouragement enjoY..ed by the Belgian industry from the 
Austrian and later F1:ench governm.ents in the form of tariff protection, 
prizes for inventior:s, tedmological contests, exhibitions, the opening 
of technical schools and subsidies were indeed of major ir.1portance. 
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Hore unexpected is the attitude of King William I of Orange, who tried 
to encourage Belgian industry as much as he could and committed part of
 
his private wealth to this purpose. The founding of the famous Societe
 
37 But this in a senseGEnerale is only one example of this policy. 
underlines rather than resolves the problem. Why would a Dutch (and 
protestant) King literally bet all his money on Belgian industry rathe
r 
than try to emulate it by establishing similar enterprises in the North
ern 
provinces? 
An argument frequently encountered in the t1ritings of Dutch economic 
historians as an explanation for their country's relative backwardness 
has 
been the lackadaisical mentality of Dutch entrepreneurs in the 18th and
 
It is interesting to note that a kind of "Landes-Gerschenkron19th centuries. 
debata" on the importance of social attituc.es an3. entrepreneurship can b
e 
. 1· 38observed among Dutch specia ists, 
"• •• The industrialist -:j;~ ti:e early capitalist period 
(i.e. 1813-1870) ••• is content with a normal profit and does 
not even consider changing his methods as lone as he is not 
compelled to by his consumers ••• he does not engage in 
organization or calculations, leaving this matter to his fore­
man ••• the industrialists of this period cannot complain abaut 
lack of leisure and could devote themselves to what was then 
considered as the noblest pas time: poetry •••
11 
·r.:h"'-i 39wri tes. ·an. au1.. y.'r ty. 
Prototypes and caricatures of narrow-minded, cautious and conservative 
entrepreneurs can be found in 19th century Dutch literature, such as in
 the 
writings of Hildebrand and Potgieter. The economic implications of th
is are 
obvious: technological backwardness, high risk aversion and high leisu
re 
preference of entrepreneurs. If one extends "entrepreneurial attitudes
" to 
include saving and investment behavior, a satisfactory explanation for 
Dutch 
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However. the differences inslow industrialization could be obtained. 
this respect between the two countries are a matter of degree rather of 
essence. Horeover, entrepreneurship was to some extent an international­
ly mobile factor--many of the pioneers of Belgian industry were English 
or of English descent so that its relative absence cannot fully account 
for long-run trends. 
Finally, the existence of a large proto-industrial sector in 
Belgium and the relative density of rural population have recently been 
put f orward as an expl anati on of in ustr a ization in •e gium.. d i 1· 
. . B 1. 4o This 
view is correct, but r,1erits some elaboration, since it is by no means clear 
which mechanism is ope~ating here. Capital accumulation in the proto­
industry, cited by i.iendels, seenec relatively minor, since there were 
severe difficulties in tra...sforr.lin3 accumulated circulating capital into 
fixed capital in._.;the abse::.ce of good capi -:al B.::i.rkets. Nor is there much 
reason to believe t~at the proto-industry created a technological and 
entrepreneurial infrastructure that facilitated the growth of modern 
industry. Inventions were by and large all imported from England and 
it is far from clear how the proto-industry facilitated their adoption. 
Most entrepreneurs, except in the woollen industry, were homines ~ 
or of commercial backgrounds and seldom directly connected to proto-
industrial production.
41 It will thus be useful to develop a more formal 





Assume an open economy in which only two commoditie
s are pro­
Before the industrial revolution both areduced, textiles and food. 
Food (A) is produced by aproduced in a traditional (rural) sector. 
usual production function with a fixed amount of lan
d, whereas the 
output of the proto-industry, Z, is produced by a o
ne-input, constant-
42
returns-to-scale technique. Thus: 
.dA iA
(1) ~ > o, 2 < 0
dL 
(2) Z = b•Lz 
Land 1 LA the amount of labor allocatedwhere Tis the (fixed) amount of 
to the production of A nnd b the productiavi.ty
 of labor in the production 
assumec: that only A is being consumed,of z. For simplicity it wi.11 be 
while Z is completely exported. Population pre
ssure on the land is such 
that agricultural output is insufficient to feed the
 whole population. 
Hence the need to supplement the peasants' budget by
 the revenue of 
exported Z goods. If the economy is small enough, 
the terms of trade 
PA 
faced by it in selling its Z goods abroad in exchang
e for food, -,
Pz 
are constant. By proper choice of units we can set
 this ratio equal to 
unity. It is clear then that the condition that pe
asants are in equi­
PA dA dA
librium requires b = P
z 
dL ~ dL" Hence population growth can go on un-
checked by the usual Halthusian mechanisms, since th
ere ~re no diminishing 
returns in the Z-good production. This is the subs
tance of Hendels' 




The more important result, for our purposes, is that b will dominate the 
agricultural wage irrespective of the allocation of labor between the 
production of Zand the production of A. 
Assume now that the industrial revolution "takes place". A new. 
modern sector is created which produces a close substitute for the z­
good. For simplicity assume that this new good is identical to the z­
good, but to avoid confusion denote it separately, Q. Assume that Q is 
produced by a production function using both fixed capital and labor in 
44
fixed proportions 
(3) Q = c•min (LQ, nK) 
where n is the number of workers manning each machine and c is the output 
of each worker. In addition, the modern sector produces machines. Machines 




(4) K = m•LK 
where mis the productivity of labour in producing machines. 
We llave thus a two-sector, open economy with a traditional sector 
producing A and z. a modern sector producing Q. and Kand a rest of the 
world sector. patiently buying all of Zand all of Qin exchange for 
A goods at a fixed ratio. Again we shall assume for simplicity that 
the workers in the modern sector consume only A goods, so that the whole 
industrial output of Zand Q goods is exported. 
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I shall introduce now two additional assumptions that are, however, 
not simplifications but stylized facts, describing the early stages of 
industrialization. The first is the assumption tr.At there is no cap
ital 
market: all (except fh"e very first) investments are financed exclus
ively 
out of retained profits.
46 Secondly, all technological change is embodied 
in new capital goods so that technological progress and capital are 
47 Consequently capital accumulation issimultaneously taking place. 
a necessary condition for industrialization and growth. The meaning 
of this assumption is that technological progress is not only defined 
as a change that enables, say, the machine making work-~ops__ to buil
d 
better machines. Technological progress also includes the transition of
 
workers from the Z~sector to the Q-sector to work on machines that embod
y 
a technology superior to the one used in the Z-sector. 
It will by now have become clear that the structure of this model 
is very similar to a surplus-labor economy, since labor can be hired at 
48 llote, however, that there is no "surplus" labora fixed cost, b. 
in this economy--all labor is employed and none is superabundant in any 





a fixed opportunity~ of labor determined by a one input and linear 
technique described by eq. (2). 
The working of the model can now be sketched. For any given capital• 
stock K (everything except the parameters is a function of time but sub­




which produces an output or revenue (since prices are set to equal uni
ty) 
(6) Q = cnK. 
On the other hand the wage rate is fixed at b. Hence total profits a
re: 
(7) R = cnK - bnK = nK(c-b). 
Out of this profit, a fixed ·iproportion s · is ploughed back into the f
irm.
'IT 
In other words, SR con~titutes a wage fund that is used to hire workers 
'IT 
in the machine producing sector. The number of workers that can be hired
 is: 
(8) 
and their output i:i te1."111s o-r- machines is: 
substituting (7) into (9) and rearranging yields: 
(10) 
On the other hand, define totalwhere g is the (warranted) rate of growth. 





(11) I = 
m 
then the rate of profit, Tr, is: 
R C g
(12) 1T = I = nm(b - 1) = s or 
Tr 
50 
g = s'lT•Tr. 
It is important to emphasize the meaning of 'IT, since for a given 
s1T, 1T will determine the rate of growth of the economy. Profits in this 
model are classical rather than neo-classical: they are the residual of 
.d 51the tota1 revenue af ter uases ]:-,ave been pai. In no way should 1T be 
regarded as the marginal product of capital. In fact, 1r, in 8eneral, 
can be shown to diverge from the latter. It is.more fruitful to view 1T 
as a rate of return to entreprene-:1.rship, tl:e rate of return to capital 
(as Solow claims) or the :iarxian rate of profit (since R is clear_ly 
of a quasi-rent. As has been noted the economy produces its output of 
textiles by two techniques, an efficient one (Q) and an inefficient one 
(Z). The econony ::annot shift inst2.ntzneously from one technique to the 
other because the superior technology is embodied in new capital goods 
and the supply of capital goods is limited by a bottleneck in saving. The 
importance of this bottleneck is detem.ined by the distribution of income 
and bys • Hence, the two techniques coexist, aacl as long as this dis-
Tf 
equilibrium situation lasts, the more efficient technique earns a quasi-
rent. The temporary nature of this rent implies that in the long run 
either nominal wages will start to risft•.until they reach c or prices
 of 
In either case the rate of profitindustrial goods will start to fall. 
and hence capital accumulation should eventually fall to zero unless
 
embodied technological change continues after the initial discontinu
ity, 
so that there are a multitude of techniques rather than two. 
The importance of eq. (12).., even in the more simplistic two-tech­
niques model is in establishing a direct link between initial income
 
distribution conditions and the rate of capital accumulation. The 
parameter bis equal to the wage rate only by virtue of the "pseudo­
In any other case, in which modern industrylabor surplus" situation. 
faces an upwards sloping labor supply curve the rate of accumulation
 
of capital is not constant as given in eq. (10) but falls over time,
 
since in this case wages rise with the process of industrialization.
 
Moreover, it will be seen that even in cases in which the supply of 
labor is infinitely elastic, the initial level of wages will be of c
rucial 
importance. Substitute WN (wages in country N) and WB (wages in count
ry B) 
Two cases can be distinguished:for b in equation (12) and assume W,l\1 
> WB. 
in one case WN > c > WB in which case country B will industrialize a
nd 
In the other case c > WN > WB' so that both count­country N will not. 
ries will adopt the new technique, but the rate of accumulation (and
 
hence of adoption) will be faster in country B. 
Needless to say, there is no contention that wage differentials 
were the most crucial factor in determining which countries would un
der­
go the industrial revolution and which not. Obviously, differences 
in 
the parameter s will have si!!lilar effects. 11oreover, there is no n
eed 
'IT 
for the three technolcr;ical parameters n, c, and m to be the sane am
ong 
-18-
countries with highly different infrastructures. It is also unrealistic 
for many countries to assume that demand was perfectly elastic. In the 
case of the Low Countries, however, it seems that these other factors, 
though anything but negligible, were of secondary order of importance 
in comparison to the wage differential. 
IV 
Why should one expect a considerable wage differential between 
Belgium and the Netherlands? As there was a large proto-industrial 
sector in Belgiuo but not in the Netherlands, the pseudo sur?lus labor 
model described in the p:-evious section applies to the former but not 
to the latter. Although there is nc, strong a priori reason why the 
parameter b, derived from. the Z-good producing sector, should be particu-
larly low, there is little ioub-:: that in £act it was. Agricultural 
productivity in Belgium was lower th2.n ir: the ::etherlands, since the 
labor/land ratio ,-,as much higher. In lSJ-5 total population of the 
Northern provinces (not including Dutch Limburg) was 2,046,885 persons 
on an area of 30,386 km2 , which yields an overall density of 67.3 persons 
per km2 • The correspondii1g figures for the Belgian provinces were 
3,377,617 on an area of 34,217 (including Luxemburg), implying a density 
2
of 98.7 per km. 
The Northern provinces were, however, much more urbanized and if 
one subtracts off urban population the ratio of agricultural population 
per km2 becomes 40.9 in the l'~orthern provinces and 78.7 in the Southern 
provinces.
52 
The gap in agricultural productivity would be smaller than 
these figures imply, because the Belgians did have the Z-goo§, so that 
agricultural productivity would not fall below the productivity in J-good 
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production. But th(: fact the.t ~ ex;:ept for two areas, there is little 
-goo t · · t·,.--·,e :,,•e·therlnnds indicates that agricultural activityZ d produc ion in . -
was, in fact, more productive than in Belgium. The noted Dutch statesman~ 
and political economist, Van Hogend..vrP, uas once asked by a Flemish gentle-
man what the Dutch peasants did if they neither spun nor wove. The reply 
was that they made butter and cheese and that this provided them with 
ff . . k 53su 1.c1.ent wor • He should have siid "sufficient income". 
The extraordinarily low wages paid in the proto-industry has struck 
contemporaries as well as historians. In the Flemish linen industry, 
for example, a memorandum from 1765 estimates the dai]yincome of a weaver 
to be 7 to 8 sous (0.63 to O. 72 centimes), which enabled the weaver to
subsist on a diet of rye bread, potatoes, buttermilk, a little bacon on 
Sundays and water. Even lower figures are quoted in a letter dating from 
1789. 54 In the 19th century~ after 2 short boom during the empire, the 
wages of linen weavers and spinners feil to new lows, :::-eaching catastrophic 
dimensions in the 1830 1 s and 1840's, 55 It shoulci be noted that during 
most of the period under discussion the Fle~ish proto-industry was for its 
greater part self-employed r<1tn.er than a ?trtt:i.ng=out ind,.1siXY, so that the 
terms of trade betueen final output~ raw· mater~_als and food ·wholly determined 
the income of the proto-::.ndustrial workers, given 2_ productivity coefficient b. 
The woollen and metallurgic:::1 rural industries in the Verviers-Lil1ge 
area and in Hainault were 1• on the other he.nd, mostly putting-out industries. 
Putting-out in the Z-good complicates the picture somewhat, especially because 
the truck systet.1 (payments of ,·,ages in kind) and embezzlement of materials 
by the workers tend to d::.atort the little information on wages that is 
available.
56 
It is clear nev~!'theless that t'.1ese wages were very low. A 
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source from 1741 estirr..ated the wages in Leyden, Tilburg and Verviers 
to relate to each other as 3:1.5:1.
57 Wages in the woollen industry 
remained more b~ less stable throughout the 18th century, rising somewhat 
in the first decade of the 19th, but less than proportionally to the 
. . 58r i se in output prices. In the nail industry in the Charleroi area, 
the best workers earned an off-season wage of 6-7 sous, whereas others 
made no more than 3-4 sous. (The sou or patard de Liege was about 70% 
of the Flemish sou). During peak seasons, wages were much higher, but 
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this lasted only for about six weeks annually. 
The situation in the Netherlands was more complicated. It is 
possible, of course, to explaj.r.. the wage differential between the 
Netherlands and Belgiurl entirely by the very absence of a prate-industry 
in the Netherlands and the h:Lgher agricultural productivity implied by 
that. But it seer.is that ,-;ages in the l~etherlands were high compared not 
6C
only to Belgium but to other countries as well. "The wages of labour 
are said to be higher :~:1 l'.olland than !_n England, and the Dutch, it is 
well known, trade upon lower p::-ofits than any :,eople in Europe" writes 
Adam Smith.
61 
Some additional conjectures in regard to the reasons of the high 
level of Dutch wages are thus in order. The fac·:: that urbanization was 
so intense may by itsel:~ be a fr,ctor, since mortality in the cities was 
high and this tends to underline the need for bidding away workers from 
agriculture at relatively high ,rages, In addition·, the existence 
of a large structure of welfare and charity organizations, especially 
in the cities, may have had considerable effect on the level of wages 
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in general and its downward stickiness in particular. In addition, 
it could be that the high wages were established during the peak of 
Dutch economic prosperity and.:/'had since outlived it, maintained by 
inertia and institutions preventing them from falling during less 
favourable periods. It is also possible that, since employment in the 
Dutch cities was either directly or i11directly connected to the 
commercial-maritime sector, employment was subject to rather severe 
fluctuations, so that wages included a risk premium. 
An interesting note is struck by Ch3rles Hilson. Tlie large 
government debt in the Hetherlands, Hilson argues, caused an exception­
ally high level of taxation. Since most taxation was indirect and 
levied on- necessary consm:1ptj_o11 gocds, this tended to drive the wage­
r..?
level up and profits ar:d :)rocuctioa down." · .L':1is fits in well uith 
the framework desc:ti:J-2cl c:t'Jove, ~specially aince taxes remained high in 
the 19th century. 
But on the other hand the emphasis on taxation raises two problems. 
First, an indirect tax T;1ill in gen.eral be borne only partially by the 
consumers in the form of higher prices. The supply curve of labor (as a 
function of nominal wages) shifts to the left, but equilibrium wages 
will rise less than proportionally to the rise in prices. In additic•, 
the employers, facing higher costs, may be able to raise output prices 
unless foreign demand is perfectly elastic. In short, the actual importance 
of indirect taxes on the wage level and on profits depends on the elasticities 
of supply and demand of consumption goods, of labor and of the final product. 
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A second problem arises from the Dutch national debt being 
largely domestically held. It is necessary to assume that the 
rentiers who owned the debt were a different subset of the population 
than the industrialists whose profits are curbed by the high wages, 
and that they had no interest in investing in industry. Otherwise, 
the high-wage-low-profit result of the Wilson-effect will be insignificant, 
since industrialists are assumed to reinvest a part of their profit. 
Finally, one could return to the entrepreneurship argument pro­
pounded above, Hicr.ceconomic theory postulates wages to be equal to 
the marginal product of labor if ::1nd only if the firm maximizes profits. 
But the essence of the er...trepr"me~1rship ar0u;:,ent seems to be that these 
"bad" entrepreneurs 'W:e·.:-e in fact not nw~dmizing profits. It does not 
matter whc~ther tl1ey were mmci.miz:.:1.z sane U''.:ility function (in which 
profits appear as cne a.q:;u:11clt': among many) or ,;,;;1ether they were not 
maximizing anyth::.ng at 1:,:1; in either case Hages will be some.where be -
tween average anq::margin2.l. p.Loduct, and thus higher than in a country in 
which entrepreneurs are more aggressive. 
V 
To summarize the foregoing, there is reason to believe that lower 
wages may have been important in determining rapid industrialization in 
Belgium and high wages in determining Dutch stagnation. It was demonstrat­
ed that there were structural differences between the two countries that 
could enhance such a gap. It is necessary to show, however, that wages 
were in fact significantly lower in Belgium. To look at nominal wages 
would be sufficient in this case s:Lnce for our purpose the interesting 
problem is not the standard of livinz of the workers, but rather the slice 
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that is left over of the revenue pie for the producer after wages have 
been paid. 
Aggregate income distribution date, for this period are, however, 
virtually unavailable. For England, for example, the data before 1880 are 
t oo seattere ' incomp1e t e · 1 2.ggreeate .~igures poss1"b1_e. 
6 As tod ana . co ma-:e -F • ~ 
the iow Countries, for ,·::ost of the first half of the 19th century the data 
are of such nature as to cast heavy doubt on the validity of any inter­
spatial comparison. It is thus fortunate that there is one source that 
allows us to perforH the comparison without the usual caveats pertaining 
to the comparison of data assembled by different statistical services. 
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This is the Dutch industrial aurvey of 1819. This survey, actually 
undertaken in.~1820, contains valuable information about the number of 
industrial firms~ the number of adults and children employed and the 
daily wages earned. In addition some qualitative information as to the 
"state of business 11 as compared with previous periods is supplied, some 
general remarks added. Since the t:eturns are;.-organized by province, it 
was possible to calculate aggregates which could be used for North vs. 
South comparisons. 
Some of the main defects of this survey should be mentioned, in 
order to underline the fact that these data are crude approximations 
and unsuitable for more powerful and refined econometric tests. For 
one tl!i:tng, the data shown in table (1) are ?rovincial averages, weighted 
by the number of ~JOrkers in each industry in that province. However, 
the original wage entries for each industry in each province as they 
appear in the returns, are already averages over all firms in that 
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industry. There is strong reason to believe that unweighted averages 
were employed by the officials in charge of aggregating the original 
returns. This procedure tends to bias the figures downwards since it 
seems that wages were positively correlated with the size of firms 
(though the correlation is weak). Other sources of possible bias and 
inaccuracy are payment of wages in kind, the seasonal nature of some 
forms of employment, the fact that many wages were piece..·-rather than 
daily wages and the particular timing of the survey (at the end of a 
prolonged depression). Some other shortcomings of the data, stemming 
from clerical or administrative error, have been corrected as far as 
65possible. 
Nonetheless, the 1819 survey constitutes a unique source of 
information for this pet:tocl. Tt sho111 n he mP.nticmed thl'lt by checkine 
provincial returns (as far as they were a\•ailable) against aggregate 
returns, it could be verified that most municipalities (uhich were in 
charge of the actual collecting of the data) conducted the survey in 
a responsible and efficient ,1ay, and the compilation and editing were 
carriedoout with scrutiny. In spite of its weaknesses, the 1819 survey 
thus:provides a unique opportunity to test the hypotheses advanced in 
this paper. The main aggregates, computed from the returns, are pre­
sented in Table I. 
It can readily be seen that adults' wages, taken as whole, are 
almost 60% higher in the Northern provinces. lloreover, the two Northern 
provinces in which wages are relatively low, Overijssel and N. Brabant, 
are the same provinces in which proto-industry existed and where the 
nuclei of modern industry started in the --t830's. In the Belgian pro-
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vinces wages are exceptionally low in Flanders and Antwerpen, some-
what higher (but still considerably below the Horthern average) in LiE!ge. 
The only exceptions are Hainault and Namur, partially explained by the 
importance of coal mines in these two provinces, which traditionally 
paid higher wages. 
----
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Table I: Total Number of Firms~ Adults and Children Employed and 
Daily Wages in Cents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Province Firms Adults Children Adults' Wages ChildrenI s J'19.lf::S 
16.5N. Brabant 8,659 12,716 2,400 55.2 
Geldtlrland 5,130 6,692 1,267 62.7 18.2 
s. Holland 6,764 20~446 1,739 86.0 25.8 
N. Holland 8,493 25,674 2,184 94.2 20.2 
Zeeland 3,094 3,653 621 82.5 19.0 
Utrecht 3,126 8,169 2,438 82.0 21.2 
Friesland 4.991 8,785 1,384 76.5 13.S 
Overijssel 4,636 12,209 3,261 58.2 32.6 
Groningen 4,606 6,606 852 76.0 22.. 3 
Drenthe 1,234 1,967 n.d. 73.4 n.d. 
Total North 50,733 106,917 16.146 74.8 22.4 
s. Brabant ·6, 732 13,608 .-538 59,8 9.5 
Limburg 6,770 6,371 2.36 52.4 19.6 
Liage 5,482 27,911 4,018 65,6 i3.9 
E. Flanders 37,2.88 101,601 10,780 40~J 17.5,. 
W. Flanders 59,336 74,675 3,806 32.3 12.8 
Hainault 8,415 32,893 2,591 77.1 29.0 
Namur 2,712 6.915 163 70.6. 30.6 
Antwerpen 7,192 23,167 1,391 48.6 24.1 
Luxembourg 8,395 12,295 273 54.S 23.6 
Total Soutj- 142,184 299,436 23,796 47.8 19.5 
"1-1.'t}"tal 193,055 406,353 39,942 54.1 20.6 
. i 
Source: See footnote.64. 
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0t~er hypotheses, testable in principle, can be derived from 
the simple model presented in section III. For example, one could 
test the hypothesis that as long as the proto-industry exists, wages 
in the modern sector do not rise significantly. In the Hetherlands 
we should see a stable or declining wage so long as population growth 
is unaccompanied by industrialization. Another test could focus on 
the relative importance of the wage differential by estimating proxies 
to the ploughing-back and technological parameters of eq. (12). It 
should also be possible to correlate the relative importance of the 
proto-industry with the wage level, but the availability of data is 
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